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The Australian economy is currently experiencing a resource boom and policy responses  to this 
boom such as migration and taxation,  as well as  the broader role of monetary and fiscal policies 
are the subject of academic as well as public debate. This paper investigates the impact of a 
resource boom in a dynamic macroeconomic model, focusing on the allocation of resources across 
sectors and changes in income distribution. Further, the paper contributes to the current policy 
debate by analysing the role and effectiveness of government policy through its migration policy 
and taxation of the mining sector, in addressing the short run and steady state impacts of a resource 
boom. Results illustrate that while increased immigration is an appropriate short run response, long 
run welfare can be enhanced by higher taxation of the mining sector. Indeed, results show that 
increased tax revenue can fund appropriate transfers to mitigate the adverse effects on labour 
income and provision of public goods to increase productivity in the rest of the economy.  
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1.  Introduction  
The current state of the Australian mining boom and its distributional impacts has attracted 
a lot of attention from policymakers, with response ranging across taxation, migration and 
labour market policies. While the possible adverse impacts of a resource boom are well 
documented in the empirical and theoretical literature, the policy response to address the 
distributional and welfare impacts of such a resource boom has been a subject of little 
analysis.  The  present  paper  analyses  the  effect  of  this  booming  sector  on  income  and 
resource distribution in the economy and on welfare using a dynamic macro model. We 
then explore the policy alternatives to deal with these distributional issues. In the context of 
the current debate about the appropriate policy settings, we demonstrate how the adverse 
effects of “Dutch Disease” can be addressed through a combination of taxation and labour 
policies with productivity-enhancing public spending.  
 
Empirical  studies  have now  established that  resource  booms  may  not  have  a  beneficial 
effect  on  the  economy  and  may  even  be  detrimental  to  economic  growth  (Sachs  and 
Warner, 2001; Ploeg, 2011). The theoretical basis for so-called Dutch Disease suggests that 
an  economy  with  a  booming  resource  export-oriented  sector  is  affected  through  two 
channels: First, it leads to an appreciation of the domestic currency and, as a result, harms 
other non-resource exporters. Second, a resources boom leads to a reallocation of factors of 
production such as labour and capital away from other sectors to the booming sector.
1 
These basic features of Dutch Disease have been highlighted by Gregory (1976) and Corden 
                                                      
1 In addition to these two channels, Anderson (1998) comprehensively discusses the role of (i) declining terms 
of trade (the ‘Prebisch-Singer’ hypothesis), (ii) externalities in non-resource sectors, (iii) technological catch-up, 





and Neary (1982). The present paper is part of a recent research effort to understand the 
distributional effects of the boom and the role of government policy. Cassing and Warr 
(1985) focus attention on income distribution during a resource boom, pointing out that it is 
the  changes  in  real  factor  incomes,  rather  than  industry  sizes,  that  determine  the 
distribution of gains and losses. Fum and Holder (2010) find that the effect of a resource 
boom depends on the ethnic composition of the society. The role of the government in 
meeting the challenges of a resource boom has increasingly come into focus, with recent 
research focusing on the political economy of the effects of resource boom and rents on the 
political state (Auty, 2010), and on fiscal policy rules in managing a resource boom (Ploeg, 
2011) .   
 
Frankel  (2010)  surveys  the  institutions  and  policies  employed  by  the  governments  with 
varying  degrees  of  success  in  managing  the  resource  booms.  Taxation  of  the  export 
commodities has been used in some developing countries, particularly if the producers are 
foreign-owned  companies.  Countries  such  as  Chile  have  tight  rules  governing  the  fiscal 
policy to make national saving procyclical, while Norway is an example of successful use of a 
sovereign wealth fund to achieve similar objectives. In addition, Alaska uses the fund to 
address distributional issues of the resource boom.  
 
While  Australia  has  previously  experienced  mining  booms  (see  Battelino,  2010,  for  an 
overview of mining booms in Australia), the current boom is notable due to (i) the extent 
and persistence of increase in terms of trade, and (ii) the timing. Currently, the terms of 





than the previous episodes of mining booms.  This boom is also occurring in the context of 
an  economy  operating  at  close  to  full  capacity,  and  is  the  first  boom  since  Australia 
abandoned  the  relatively  fixed  exchange  rate  regime.  Impacts  of  the  mining  boom  are 
already showing up in the economy. An increase in mining output creates imbalances, with 
the share of output of sectors such as manufacturing declining (Figure 1).  Demand for 
mining commodities has led to an increase in current and future planned production which, 
in turn, is taking the investment in this sector to historically high levels (4 percent of GDP 
compared to an average of 2 percent (Stevens, 2011)). While mining is a relatively capital 
intensive sector that accounts for a small proportion (1.8 percent) of total employment, 
Figure 2 illustrates the dramatic growth in the labour employed in this sector. This demand 
for  labour  puts  pressure  on  wages  and  employment  in  other  sectors  of  the  economy. 
Indeed, the challenge of meeting this increased labour demand in the mining sector has led 
the  government  to  moderate  its  earlier  decision  of  cutting  immigration  intakes  and  to 
allocate an increased number of immigrant workers in the recent 2011 budget.  
 
In order to meet the challenges of the mining boom and to address the imbalances in the 
economy, the Australian government in 2010 proposed a higher tax on the mining sector 
(the Minerals Resource Rent Tax). The design of this policy has been vigorously debated in 
terms of taxing of economic rents (e.g., see Ergas et al., 2010, and Freebairn and Quiggin, 
2010).  The  present paper  provides  another  perspective  on  the  debate  by  exploring  the 
effects of such taxation policy in addressing the allocation problems, as well as addressing 






The challenge for the policymakers is to manage the adverse impacts of the resource boom. 
While monetary policy can target inflation resulting from demand pressures in the resource 
sector, it cannot fundamentally address the underlying allocation of factors of production 
and income distribution. In fact, a higher interest rate worsens the pressure on the rest of 
an economy that is already squeezed by the resource boom. Thus, the role of government 
through its labour market policies, public good provision, and taxation and redistribution 
policies, becomes crucial in times of resource booms.  However, with the exception of an 
analysis of its role in the tourism sector (Chang et al., 2011), this role of government has not 
been  analysed  in  the  context  of  macroeconomic  models.  We  address  this  gap  in  the 
literature by (i) analysing first the short run and steady state impacts of the resource boom 
in a dynamic macroeconomic model, the results focussing on allocation of labour and capital 
across sectors and on income distribution in the economy, and (ii) investigating the policy 
options for the government to address the adverse effects of a resource boom.  
 
Section  2  develops  a  dynamic  macroeconomic  model  for  an  economy  experiencing  a 
resource boom. The results show that a mining boom will lead to a decline in manufacturing 
output, shift the income distribution in favour of capital, and can lead to a welfare loss in 
the  long  run.  Immigration  and  taxation  policy  settings  and  role  of  the  government  in 
addressing efficiency and equity challenges posed by the short run and long run effects of a 







2.  The model 
Let us consider a model economy with two sectors: non-mining (manufacturing) and mining. 
We assume that the non-mining good, X , is generally consumed domestically, although it 
can be traded internationally, while the mining output (Y ) is produced only for exports.  
 
There are three types of agents in the economy: firms, households, and government. The 
external  sector  is  given  exogenously.  Trade  is  always  balanced.  In  order  to  focus  on 
domestic resource allocation, we abstract from capital flows. In general, a resource boom 
results  in  an  increase  in  returns  to  capital,  hence,  capital  inflows  and  possible  over - 
borrowing  (e.g.  Cassing  and  Warr,  1985;  Kuralbayeva  and  Vines,  2008).  Under  the 
assumption that trade and financial accounts should be balanced in the long run, we can 
abstract  from  financial  borrowing  in  our  analysis.  Moreover,  capital  mobility  will  not 
eliminate the distortion created by a mining boom in factor allocation between sectors as 
long as the levels of capital-intensity vary between sectors. Since our main focus is on the 
effect of a mining boom on this allocation of factors of production in the economy, we can 
abstract from the external side of the economic activities. 
 
Firms  produce  goods  and  maximize  after-tax  profits  taking  the  inputs  prices  given. 
Households  maximize  their  intertemporal  utility  by  consuming  good  and  services  (X ) 
subject  to  their  budget  constraint.   In  addition,  households  hold  assets  in  the  form  of 
ownership  of  claims  on  capital used  by  firms.   Government  taxes firms  and  spends  the 





from income taxes in order to concentrate on the effects of differential taxation for the two 
sectors in the economy.  It is also assumed that the government budget is always balanced. 
 
2.1. The supply side 
The two sectors in the economy, mining and manufacturing, are perfectly competitive and 
use both capital and labour in production. Firms produce goods and pay wages and rental 
payments. We take the non-mining good  X as a numeraire; hence, the relative price of the 
output of the mining sector Y is defined as  P .  Given the context of Australia as a small 
open  economy,  we  assume  that  the  price  for  mining  output  is  determined  by  the 
international markets and, hence, is exogenous for the economy. The government taxes 
firms’ output at the rate  x   for manufacturing firms and rate  y    for mining firms.  
 
Manufacturing sector 
 Firms in the manufacturing sector employ a Cobb-Douglas technology to produce good X : 
   
 
1 , 0 1, xx X AK L
 
      (1) 
where technology coefficient,  A, is a function of  the productive government services,g , 
such that    ,  ( ) 0, ( ) 0. A g A g A g    x K  and  x L  , respectively stand for capital and labour 
employed in the production of X . Parameter  is the share of capital.   
  
Given  the  production  function,  the  representative  firm  in  the  ma nufacturing  sector 






, max (1 )
xx
x x x x KL X wL rK       ,  (2) 
where  ris the rental rate of capital and w is the wage rate. For simplicity, we assume that 
the  depreciation  rate  of  capital  is  zero.  The  first -order  conditions  yield  the  following 








 ,  (3) 
and the wage rate: 
 






 .  (4)
   
Mining sector  
A  representative  firm  in  the  mining  sector  employs  a  Cobb-Douglas  technology  and 
produces mining output: 
 
1 , 0 1,   yy Y BK L
 
      (5) 
where  B is a constant technology coefficient,  and  y K  and  y L  stand for capital and labour 
employed in the production ofY , respectively. Parameter  denotes the share of capital. 
The  mining  sector  is  assumed  to  be  more  capital  intensive than  manufacturing,    . 
Further, note that productivity in the manufacturing sector depends on the provision of 
government services, while productivity in the mining sector is assumed to be independent. 
This  reflects  the  fact  that  the  location  and  operation  of  most  manufacturing  firms  are 






A  representative  firm  in  the  mining  sector  maximizes  after-tax  profits,  y  ,  given  the 
production function: 
 
, max (1 )
yy
y y y y KL PY wL rK       ,  (6) 
where ris the rental rate of the physical capital and w is the wage rate.  These rental rates 








 ,  (7) 
and: 
 






 .  (8) 
 
Factor markets  
Since all sectors operate under perfect competition, after tax profits will be zero. Total 
labour force Lis divided between manufacturing and mining sectors: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) XY L t L t L t    (9) 
That is: 
 
( ) ( )
1. 
( ) ( )
XY
xy
L t L t
ll
L t L t
      (10) 
Similarly, total capital is a sum of capital employed in manufacturing and mining: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) XY K t K t K t .  (11) 
In terms of fractions of the total capital stock: 
 
( ) ( )
1.
( ) ( )
XY
xy
K t K t
vv
K t K t
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  we write the following: 
  ( ) . x x y y x y x y
K
k l k l k k k k l
L
        (13) 
Hence: 










  (14) 
Capital allocation across the two sectors is determined as:  






   (15) 
The last result implies that the equilibrium values of   and  xy kk determine the allocation of 
factors in the two sectors. Given the per worker stock of capital in each sector, we can 
express output in each sector in per worker terms. That is, output per worker will be given 
by:  
  , x x Ak
    (16) 
and:  
  y y Bk
  .  (17) 
Foreign trade 
We assume that all mining output is exported and foreign currency earnings are used to 
import  manufactured  consumer  good,  which  is  a  perfect  substitute  for  domestically 
produced manufactured good  X . For simplicity we assume that trade is always balanced, 







This implies that: 
  ( ) ( )
I
xY C t PD t  ,  (18) 
where  ()
I
x Ct   is  imported  manufactured  good  and  () Y Dt is  foreign  demand  for  mining 
output, Y . 
 
2.2. The demand side 
The demand for goods consists of domestic demand from households for manufactured 
goods and foreign demand for mining output. 
 
Households 
Labour force,  () L t L  ,  is assumed  to be static in order to abstract from population growth 
issues. If total consumption of good X  is given as a sum of both the domestically produced 
and  its  perfect  substitute  imported  from  overseas, ( ) ( ) ( )
HI
xx C t C t C t    at  timet,  then 
consumption  per  adult  person  is  given  by  ( ) ( )/ ( ) c t C t L t  .  Each  household's  wishes  to 




t U u c t e dt


  ,  (19) 
subject to its budget constraints: 
  () k rk w c h     ,  (20) 





where  k and  / k K L  stand for a change and level of  physical capital stock per worker 
respectively,   is  the  time  preference,    and  h  is  the  lump-sum  transfers  provided  by 
government. 
 
Let us assume a specific functional form for the instantaneous utility as  ( ) log( ) u c c  and 
find the first-order conditions of the household’s problem. 
 
To solve this problem we set up the following Hamiltonian: 
   
() ) () (
nt H log rk ce w c h
 
     .  (22) 
The first-order conditions are: 








,  (23) 




   

    

.  (24) 
To rule out non-optimal solutions the following transversality condition is assumed to be 
satisfied: 
  lim[ ( ) ( )] 0
t t k t 
  .  (25) 
 
Foreign demand  













where   S  stands for the demand shock parameter that represents a positive effect on the  
demand  for  mining  sector  output,  so  that  0 Y D
S
   .    In  addition,  it  is  assumed  that 
demand declines with higher prices, hence,  0 Y D
P
   .   
 
Since the home country does not consume mining output, its relative price, P , is exogenous 
to this economy.  Moreover, from (26) one can find that () 0 Y PD
S
   , which implies that 
any shift in the foreign demand for resources results in a nominal increase in the output of 
the mining sector. It is sensible to assume that this increase in nominal demand is partly 
caused by the increase in price level, P .  
 
The government 
The government collects revenue (in per worker terms),  R , by  taxing the profits of  mining 
and manufacturing firms. The collected revenue is spent on lump-sum transfers, T , and on 
provision of productive public goods ,  g . 
  , gR   and  (27) 
    (1- ) , TR     (28) 
where  is the share of spending on production of public  good . Thus, the government faces 
the following budget constraint expressed in per worker terms: 
  ( )( ). xy R x Py       (29) 
Given the burden of the public sector on the private sector, we can also state the overall 





  (1 ) (1 ) xy k x Py c          .  (30) 
 
2.3. Macroeconomic Equilibrium 
2.3.1.  Definition 
Equilibrium  in  this  economy  is  defined  by  a  sequence  of  prices  0 ( ), ( ), ( )
t P t r t w t

 , real 
allocations 
0 ( ), ( ), ( ), , , , , , x x y y t C t K t L t l v l v x y

 , and policy variables   ,, xy    such that: 
i.  the optimization problems of households and firms; and  
ii.  the budget constraints of households and the government are satisfied. 
iii.  labour market, goods market, and capital market clear; and 
iv.  the aggregate resource constraint (30) is satisfied. 
 
2.3.2.  Results 
The optimality conditions are derived by solving the first order conditions of the consumers 
and producers: 
   
  c u   ,  (31) 
  xy w w w ,  (32) 
  yx r r r  ,  (33) 







.  (34) 

















      (35) 
















  (37) 
From  XY w w w  , we  can write: 
  (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) x x y y A k PB k
          .  (38) 
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     
          
 

    
           
  (43) 
 
2.3.3.  Short-run equilibrium 
Examining equation (34), we can see that in the short run (as defined by Brock, 1996) for 
given  k  and  , a mining boom caused by a shift in foreign demand  leads to an increase in  
the  price  of  Y.  Moreover,  in the  context  of  a  small  economy,  this  price  is  exogenously 
determined. Therefore, we can analyse the impact of shifts in external demand for mining 
output in terms of an increase in the price of the mining good.   
 
Proposition 1. A mining boom leads to a shift towards more labour-intensive production. 
Proof.  Based  on  expressions  given  by  (40)-(43)  we  can  confirm  that,  in  the  short  run,
0 and  0, 





hold.   This implies that production becomes less capital intensive, 
hence, more labour intensive.  
 
Equations (40)-(43) illustrate the effect of a price increase in the mining sector on allocation 
of capital and labour in the economy. A mining boom leads to a lower capital-labour ratio 
and a lower share of total labour in the manufacturing sector (good X ). On the other hand, 
the mining sector gets a higher allocation of labour due to the following result: 
  0,  0 











Lower capital-labour ratio in both sectors is also consistent with an increase in relative 
return to capital, 
1







.  (45) 
This result is the well-known Stolper-Samuelson theorem which states that if the price of 
capital-intensive good rises, the rental price of capital rises. Further, the increase in rental 
price is greater relative to the increase in the output price. 
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Results  given  by  Proposition  1  and  the  production  technology  employed  by  the 







.  (47) 
This result is summarised as the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1. In the short run, a mining boom leads to a contraction in manufacturing output.   
 
This effect of a mining boom poses a problem of a two-speed economy. The main policy 
implication of such a condition is that a monetary policy would prove to be less effective 
since it cannot differentiate between the growing and contracting sectors.  Further, as seen 
from equation (45), relative return to capital, 
1






contractionary  monetary  policy  to  counteract  the  effects  of  a  resource  boom  would 
exacerbate this distortion by suppressing wages relative to the interest rate. 
 
Thus, we can trace the effect of a mining boom on employment and wages based on these 
short-run results.  Using the wage rate equations we can write: 
  (1 )(1 ) xx w A k
       (48) 







.   However, before attaining equilibrium where wage rates are equalized as,  
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) , x x x y y y w A k w PB k
             
there will be a transition path during which the demand shock will lift the wage rate in the 
mining  sector,  so  that  . xy ww    This  disequilibrium  then  drives  the  reallocation  of 
production factors from the non-mining sector to the mining sector. In any case, we see that 
the initial effect of a mining boom on prices is inflationary driven by the relative growth of 
wage rate in the mining sector. Moreover, the wage growth stemming from a mining boom 
implies  that  labour  demand  in  the  manufacturing  sector  falls  to  accommodate  both, 
increasing wages and falling output, demonstrated by (48) and (47) respectively.  
  (1 )(1 ) xx L w X       (49) 
In the manufacturing sector, a decrease in output and increasing wage rates lead to a fall in 







2.3.4.  Steady-state equilibrium 
 
Based on (24) and(30), the dynamics of the economy are described by the following system 
of differential equations: 
    (1 ) xk x          (50) 
  (1 ) (1 ) xy k x Py c            (51) 
To  rule  out  suboptimal  solutions,  it  is  also  assumed  that  the  following  transversality 
condition holds: 
   
() lim ( ) 0
rt
t k t e
 
  .  (52) 
We need to determine the Jacobian of this system: 
 
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ;
(1 ) ; (1 )
x y x
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   
                      
     
  (53) 
It can be verified that the determinant of the Jacobian is negative, 0 J  ; thus, the steady-
state equilibrium is saddle-point stable. The proof is given in the Appendix. 
 
By assuming  0   and 0 k  and solving (50), one can find steady state value of  and k .  
From (42) and (43), it is clear that in a steady state  . for  , . i l const i x y   This implies, based 
on (13), that  . for  , , i k const i x y   and based on (15) that  . for  , . i v const i x y  Then, from 
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  .  (55) 
Based on the above expression (54), we can show the effect of relative price increase on the 
steady state capital stock. This implication is stated as the following lemma.    
 
Lemma 2. A mining boom results in a reduction of steady state capital stock per worker.  








This outcome is driven by the fact that an increase in relative returns to capital caused by a 
mining boom results in a shift towards labour-intensive production. This implies that the 
stock of capital per worker in the steady state is reduced. This finding is in line with the 
result by Van Wijnbergen (1985), who has shown that if the non-traded sector is more 
labour intensive than the traded sector, a resource boom results in decline of capital stock. 







Next, we need to analyse the effect of a mining boom on welfare in the long run, which 
depends  on  the  long-run  (steady-state)  consumption  level.  Hence,  based  on  differential 
equation  (51),  we  analyse  how  steady-state  consumption  (1 ) (1 ) xy c x Py         is 













Then the change in welfare is determined by: 





             
.  (56) 
  
Clearly,  if  the  effect  of  de-industrialisation  (that  is,  the  impact  of  a  contraction  in  the 
manufacturing sector) is stronger than the positive terms of trade effect on the mining 
sector,  the  overall  effect  on  long-run  consumption  per  capita  becomes  negative.  This 
discussion is stated as the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2. A mining boom may result in a long-run welfare loss. 
 
This result can be viewed as a version of the so-called “immiserizing growth” coined by 
Bhagwatti  (1958).  For  example,  Chao  et  al.  (2006),  and  Hazari  and  Nowak  (2003) 
demonstrate a possibility of immiserization in the home country due to a boom in tourism.  
Along this line, Beladi and Marjit (1992) present a model of an economy with an enclave, 
demonstrating that if a protected import-competing sector exists and the rents to foreign 
capital are repatriated, immiserizing growth occurs when the enclave expands. Saha and 





if  labour  in  the  economy  is  immobile.  In  general,  a  two-speed-economy  appears  to  be 
harmful for the welfare of the economy. This is corroborated by Basu and Hazari (2008), 
who find that an increase in urban capital caused by a worsening of the relative price of 
rural non-traded goods to urban non-traded goods necessarily immiserizes the rural region 
and thereby increases inequality among regions. 
 
The negative impact of a mining boom comes through its contribution to a worsening of 
income  distribution.  We  can  identify  this  effect  by  considering  the  increase  in  long-run 





.  This result implies that during a 
mining boom, those who generate most of their income in the form of labour income will 
have a relatively lower income than those who derive most of their income from rental 
returns to capital.  
 
3.  Policy Implications 
The findings from the short-run analysis indicate that a mining boom leads to a reallocation 
of labour from manufacturing to mining and to an increase in wages during the transition to 
a new equilibrium.  We assume no labour market frictions in this model. In reality, frictions 
and rigidities in the labour market means that some workers who lose their jobs in sector 
X  cannot shift to sectorY . This leads to an increase in the natural rate of unemployment, 
and the mining sector will face labour shortages. Clearly, with increased impediments to 
labour reallocation, labour shortages in the mining sector become more acute and result in 





decline in the labour demand in the manufacturing sector. Thus, especially in the short run, 
a mining boom leads to a problem of labour allocation across the two sectors and puts 
additional pressure on the non-mining sector of the economy.  
 
Immigration is one of the policy measures that can help tackle this challenge of labour 
allocation  in  the  short  run.  As  a  transitional  measure,  an  increase  in  immigration, 
particularly migration targeted at meeting the additional demand in mining, can soften the 
impact of a mining boom on the labour market conditions. If all of the added labour demand 
generated  in  mining  sector, (1 )(1 ) ( ) yY L PY       ,  is  covered  by  immigration  and 
labour movements from sector  X ,  there will be no wage increase. In reality, of course it is 
not possible to exactly match the changes in labour demand by changes in immigration. 
However, the right policy response in the short run is to increase, rather than decrease, the 
migration  intake.  Overall,  an  appropriate  mix  of  increased  migration  and  improved 
transition of labour across sectors will work to relieve the upward pressure on wages caused 
by a mining boom. It is important to note, however, that while immigration would help 
mitigate  the  short  run  adverse  effect  on  wages,  it  cannot  be  a  long  term  solution.  The 
reason is that a mining boom lowers wages relative to the return on capital in the long run. 
Therefore, added increases in labour supply would further worsen the gap between labour 
income earners and capital owners.  
 
Another way to moderate the impact of the mining boom on wages as well as on the steady 





the mining sector will decrease the real returns to capital in the mining sector and dampen 
the wage increase. Revenues generated by taxing sector Y at a higher rate () yx    can be 
used to pay social benefits or to fund training for those who lose jobs in sectorX , and to 
improve provision of public goods (infrastructure) that increase the productivity in sector X
.  By considering the respective comparative statics, we can verify that the distortive effect 
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effect of taxation is also reinforced by the positive externality of public spending,  g , on 
productivity  in  the  manufacturing  sector,  () Ag ,  as  ( ) 0 Ag   .  Generally  higher  the 
productivity  enhancement  provided  by  the  public  sector  to  the  non-resource  sectors, 
smaller would be the tax surcharge imposed on mining. 
 
An important point here is that the taxation policy in this context should be aimed towards 
correction of distortions, rather than the fiscal needs of the government. Over-taxing the 
mining sector to solve fiscal difficulties can prove to be welfare-deteriorating in the long 
run, as a mining boom has a positive effect through domestic spending of the profits earned 
by the mining companies. We summarize this discussion as the following proposition. 
   
Proposition 3. Imposition of tax rates on the profits of mining sector firms, which is higher 
than  for  the  tax  rate  for  the  rest  of  the economy,  offsets  the  de-industrialisation  effect 






The  results  also  illustrate  that  a  mining  boom  contributes  to  a  worsening  of  income 
distribution. Hence, higher taxation of the mining sector is also justified on the grounds of 
equity; government may re-distribute a part of the tax receipts to the households severely 
affected by the distortions caused by a mining boom.  The role of fiscal policy, both through 
taxation and redistribution via transfer payments and public goods provision, is particularly 
important given that the monetary policy response to a mining boom is likely to be a rise in 
interest  rates.  Higher  interest  rates  actually  aggravate  the  adverse  effect  of  a  resource 
boom on the non-resource sectors, as the results indicate that they are already facing higher 
than usual returns to capital.  
 
Higher taxation of the mining sector should not be seen as an easy way to collect taxes for 
government needs and may not be justified solely on the grounds of super-profits. However, 
our analysis shows that differential taxation is one of the ways of ensuring that the overall 
effect of the boom is welfare-improving by correcting the distortions created by a mining 
boom in terms of the pressure on factor prices, output and productivity in non-resource 
sectors, and income distribution in the economy.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
Using a dynamic macroeconomic model we have demonstrated the effect of a resource 
boom on allocations in the economy. Tracing the effects of a boom in the resource sector on 
the rest of the economy, the model highlights the distributional impacts. Positive demand 





can lead to a long run welfare loss if such de-industrialisation outweighs the positive terms 
of the trade effect. Importantly, returns to capital increase at the cost of returns to labour, 
creating challenges in the form of income distribution within the economy.   
 
These effects of a resource boom pose unique challenges for policymakers. This paper has 
investigated the appropriate mix of policy options which are the subject of current debate in 
Australia,  and  has  demonstrated  that  monetary  policy  response  would  exacerbate  the 
adverse  distributional  impacts  between  labour  and  capital.  Similarly,  while  higher 
immigration would ease the short run labour allocation problem, it would increase the gap 
between labour and capital incomes in the long run. Higher taxation of the mining sector, on 
the other hand, would moderate the effect on wages as well as on the steady state welfare. 
The results of this paper demonstrate that such a tax regime can be efficient and equitable, 
particularly if the increased tax revenue is appropriately used to compensate labour income 










Appendix: Stability of steady state equilibrium 
 
Let us write  
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ;
(1 ) ; (1 )
x y x
kk k
x y P c P c
P y y
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 in equilibrium, the magnitude of which 
assumes that downward stickiness of prices should be less than the magnitude of change in 
real  output;  hence  11 0 m  .  Clearly,  when  the  system  is  out  of  steady  state,  22 0 m  . 












, and hence,  12 0 m  . 
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